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"The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of
invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law. 'The necessity
of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the
commercial world. '"
"The trilogy of public policies underlying trade secret laws are now: (1) the
maintenance of commercial morality; (2) the encouragement of invention and
innovation; and (3) the protection of the fundamental right of privacy of the
trade secret owner. '
Trade secret law is complex and still emerging,3 but throughout its
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1. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (quoting National Tube Co. v. Eastern
Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902).
2. 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.05, at 1-15 (1997). The Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition recognizes Mr. Jager as a trade secret law authority. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporter's notes at 438 ("The principal treatises on the law of trade secrets
are M. Jager, Trade Secrets Law and R. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets.").
3. This complexity and flux is underscored by the fact that a simple definition of trade secret
remains elusive. Q. American Wheel & Eng'g Co. v. Dana Molded Prods, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 1291,
1294 (M1. App. Ct. 1985) (stating that trade secret definition is elusive "because it includes a wide
spectrum of categories subject to variations depending upon the facts of a particular case"). The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recently set forth the following comprehensive definition: "A
trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and
that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPION § 3.03(2) (1995). Before the Restatement's definition,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws commissioned its own definition:
'Trade Secret' means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii)
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACt ("UTSA"), 14 U.L.A. 369 (1997). The original version of the UTSA was
approved in 1979, and an amended version was approved in 1985. See 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). Despite
the widespread adoption of the UTSA as a model for state trade secret statutes, see Christopher Rebel
Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 427, 429 (1995), and the
increasing citation of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), most
courts still rely upon the widely-recognized trade secret definition found in the 1939 Restatement of
Torts. See I JAGER, supra note 2, § 3.01, at 3-41; MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01, at 1-3 (1997);
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development, trade secret law has consistently promoted minimum standards
of commercial ethics.4 Indeed, promoting commercial ethics is one of trade
secret law's fundamental purposes.5 Consistent with this ethical purpose, trade
secret law proscribes the use of improper means6 to acquire another's trade
secrets.7 Improper means of acquiring trade secrets include familiar methods
of industrial espionage, such as wiretapping and eavesdropping, 8 as well as
methods that are not so familiar, like aerial surveillance. 9
However, one simple yet highly effective method of industrial espio-
nage-dumpster diving'°-is not consistently recognized by courts as an
improper means of obtaining trade secrets. As a result, a dumpster diving
victim faces the burden of demonstrating that even though her alleged trade
secret was in the trash, its secrecy was nonetheless "reasonably" protected.
Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation:A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth AmendmentAnalogy, 106
HARV. L. REV. 461, 462 (1992); see also William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct
Constitutes Misappropriation ofa Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287, 288 (1990) ("[A] review of trade secret
cases reveals that few courts rely on the [state] statutes for authority and most prefer to cite the
Restatement of Torts from 1939."). The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as consisting of "any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives
[one] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."
RESrATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cemt. b (1939). It further warns that "[a]n exact definition of a trade
secret is not possible." Id.
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995); 1 JAGER, supra note
2, § 1.03, at 1-7 ("The concern for business morality has been a constant theme as the common law of
trade secrets has developed in the United States over the last century.").
5. See supra text accompanying notes 1 & 2; 1 JAGER supra note 2, § 1.02, at 1-7 ("The
encouragement of increasingly higher standards of fairness and commercial morality, as noted in
Kewanee, continues to be the touchstone of trade secret law in the courts.").
6. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 43 (1995). Proper means of acquiring trade secrets are independent discovery and
analysis of publicly available products or information, otherwise known as "reverse engineering." Id.
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEIMON § 43 (1995).
8. See Comment, Corporate Privacy:A Remedyforthe Victim of Industrial Espionage, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 391, 398 n.43 ("Eavesdropping was, at any rate, a crime itself at common law.").
9. See E.L DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). For a
discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying note 102. Other improper means include bribery,
breach of confidence, and fraud. C. Comment, supra note 8, at 404.
10. As used in this Note, "dumpster diving" refers to clandestine trash searches conducted for the
sole purpose of obtaining trade secrets. See James M. Atkinson, Ten Spy-Busting Secrets (The Top 10
Spy-Busting Tips the Snoops Don't Want You To Know) (visited Dec. 15, 1997)
<http://www.tscm.comlmurray.html> ("#1-Trash Trawling Dumpster diving, waste archeology, or
trashing, all refer to rifling garbage in an effort to cull valuable information. This is believed to be the
number one method of business and personal espionage .... Surprise! In and of itself, stealing garbage
is legal."). Outside of the trade secret context, dumpster diving can refer to a broad range of activities.
The ranks of harmless dumpster divers include homeless persons seeking food scraps and college
students searching for old furniture. See JOHN HOFFMAN, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DUMPSTER DIVING
(1993). Harmful dumpster divers include credit card thieves, see Ken Fisher, Cashier Helps Crack
Credit Card Scam; Police Say Man Got Cards in Names of Other People, PT. POsr-GAZETrE, Sept.
12, 1996, at W1 (discussing statement of U.S. Postal Inspector John Wisniewski, Credit Card Task
Force Coordinator); see also Credit Card Scam Spurs Search of Teens' Homes, HARTFORD COURANT,
Sept. 7, 1996, atB3, and paparazzi who engage in invasive searches, see California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 51-52 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When a tabloid reporter examined then-Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger's trash and published his findings, Kissinger was 'really revolted' by the intrusion
and his wife suffered 'grave anguish.'").
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The weight of this burden becomes nearly insurmountable considering the need
to overcome the judicial presumption set forth by the Supreme Court in
California v. Greenwood,"1 that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in trash (the "Greenwood presumption"). In Frank W. Winne & Son v.
Palmer,"2 a U.S. district court relied on the Greenwood presumption to hold
that trade secrets placed in the trash in discernible form are not legally
protected (the "Winne rationale"). 3
This Note argues that the Winne rationale undermines trade secret law's
fundamental purpose of promoting commercial ethics 4 by denying protection
from predatory trash searches that clearly "fall below the generally accepted
standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct."'" Part I of this
Note discusses the threat posed by dumpster divers and the availability of
private security measures. Part II first demonstrates that since most legislatures
have not specifically classified dumpster diving as an improper means, courts
are likely to fixate on the victim's secrecy precautions16 but neglect to
11. 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless
search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home).
12. No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991); see infra text
accompanying note 78.
13. The rationale by which the Winne court incorporated the Greenwood presumption into trade
secret law has been called the Fourth Amendment analogy. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
14. This purpose is the first of what Melvin F. Jager has called the "trilogy of public policies
underlying trade secret laws." See 1 JAGER supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939). The Winne rationale also offends two more of
the "trilogy" of public policies underlying trade secret law: the encouragement of innovation and the
protection of privacy. See 1 JAGER supra note 2. The rationale undermines innovation by forcing trade
secret owners to devote valuable resources to prevent industrial spies from siphoning off the fruits of
costly research and development. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a
(1995) ("More recently, the protection of trade secrets has been justified as a means to encourage
investment in research by providing an opportunity to capture the returns from successful innovations.");
Comment, Dead or Alive?: The Misappropriation Doctrine Resurrected in Texas, 33 HOUS. L. REV.
447, 471-72 n.214 and accompanying text (1996) ("Businesses, unable to discern when a court will
consider certain competition unfair, are less likely to compete zealously, slowing down the rate of
progress in the business industry."). The Winne rationale condones implicitly the violation of the privacy
interests of trade secret owners, interests that were recognized in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) ("Finally, certain aspect of trade secret law operated to protect
non-economic interests outside the sphere of congressional concern in the patent laws. As the Court
noted: [a] most fundamental human right, that ofprivacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is
condoned or is made profitable.") (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1973)).
Trade secret law and privacy interests have been linked in several contexts. See Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890) (arguing that trade secret
law embodies natural conceptions of privacy). But see Note, supra note 3, at 465 (remarking critically
that "references to privacy rights in trade secret cases have enticed judges and commentators alike to
delve into the law's largest font of privacy jurisprudence-the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure"). The remedies available to trade secret owners who are victimized
by industrial espionage might be bolstered by the further development of the right of privacy rationale.
C. Corporate Privacy, supra note 8, at 391.
16. See generally David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept
"Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy," 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 321 (1989) (discussing the requirements necessary to comply with the secrecy
requirements of trade secret law and demonstrating how to develop an effective protection program
using a cost-benefit analysis).
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carefully examine the propriety of dumpster diving. Part II then discusses the
use of the so-called Fourth Amendment analogy to determine the reasonable-
ness of secrecy precautions in two dumpster diving cases, Tennant Co. v.
Advance Machine Co., which condemned dumpster diving, and Frank W
Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer,"8 which allowed it. Part III criticizes the Winne
rationale for relying on an outdated notion of the nature and value of trash, and
for failing to distinguish trash searches by accountable public officials from
those conducted by self-interested business competitors. Part IV discusses a
second approach, the cost-benefit approach suggested by E.L DuPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), which
involved surveillance that, though legal on its face, was nonetheless held to be
an improper means of obtaining trade secrets. Part V argues that both the
Fourth Amendment analogy and the cost-benefit framework inadequately
address trade secret law's purpose of promoting commercial ethics, and
advocates the adopting a combined Tennant and cost-benefit test that also
carefully considers the ethicality of dumpster diving. Part VI briefly highlights
two recent reforms: Connecticut's classification of dumpster diving as a form
of espionage ("Connecticut solution"),19 and the Economic Espionage Act
("EEA").ro This Note concludes that comprehensive reform requires
legislatures to designate dumpster diving as an improper means, and courts to
consider dumpster diving within an analytical framework that carefully weighs
each of the three fundamental public policies underlying trade secret law:
commercial morality, the encouragement of innovation, and the protection of
privacy. The synthesis of these three fundamental concerns into the continually
developing common law of trade secrets should yield more just and predictable
decisions in cases involving all forms of industrial espionage, not only
dumpster diving.
I. DUMPSTER DIVING AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
A. The Threat
"The level of sophistication of espionage operations directed against U.S.
companies is extraordinary. American companies are like innocent children in
17. 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct App. 1984).
18. No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991).
19. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51, as amended by Pub. Act No. 97-110. The author of this Note
proposed the original bill and testified on its behalf before the Connecticut Judiciary Committee. See
Thomas Scheffey, The Legal Spawning Ground, CONN. LAW TRIB. (Mar. 31, 1997) NEWS at 1.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839, enacting P.L. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996); S. Rep. No. 104-359 (1996).
The EEA is the first federal statute that directly addresses misappropriation of trade secrets. See Chaim
A. Levin, Economic Espionage Act: A Whole New Ball Game, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 2, 1997, at 5 (outlining
the provisions and effect of the new law).
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the forest. They have no idea how many wolves are after them. "2
Dumpster diving is part of a larger industrial espionage problem that costs
U.S. businesses billions of dollars each year.' As the relative importance of
intellectual property with respect to other corporate assets has increased, so has
information piracy. A survey of 325 U.S.-based companies by the American
Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) revealed that between 1992 and 1995,
breaches of corporate security climbed by 323 %.2 And those were just the
reported breaches-corporate victims are often silent about successful raids
against their intellectual property.24 Considering undetected and unreported
thefts, ASIS estimates that U.S. industry loses two billion dollars per month to
intellectual property pirates.' This figure is alarming since proprietary
knowledge makes up more than half of a typical manufacturer's total market
value. 6 Accordingly, industrial espionage, especially when conducted by
foreign governments,27 seriously threatens our nation's economic well-
21. Reinhard Vogler, former East German intelligence officer. Mr. Vogler is based in Berlin and
advises multinational companies on economic espionage. See Ronald E. Yates, Corporate Cloak and
Dagger: Spying-Either by Rival Businesses or Foreign Governments-Can Cut Right to the Heart of
a Vulnerable Corporation, But Congress Is Considering Ways To Strike Back, CIn. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1996,
at Cl.
22. See Alan Farnham & Jeanne C. Lee, How Safe Are Your Secrets?: In the Infotech Age They're
Less Safe Than You Think. Now a New Law Protects Them-But Watch Out. If You Learn Another
Company's Trade Secrets, Even Inadvertently, It Can Land You in Jail, FORTUNE, Sept. 8, 1997, at 114
("FBI director Louis Freeh says more than $24 billion a year in proprietary information is being
pinched."). Concern about trade secret law's inability to deal adequately with industrial espionage is not
new. See Comment, Theft ofTrade Secrets: The Needfor a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
401 (1971) [hereinafter Statutory Solution ("[lI]nvestments in technological progress, coupled with ever
more rapid obsolescence, have led to an increased reliance on trade secrets and know-how licensing on
a national and international scale, and a corresponding rise in industrial espionage. The present
patchwork of confused common law doctrines and state criminal statutes is inadequate to protect the first
and prevent the second.").
23. This represents an increase from about 10 breaches per month to 32. See H. Garrett DeYoung,
Thieves Among Us: If Knowledge Is Your Most Important Asset, Why Is It So Easily Stolen?, INDUSTRY
WEEK, June 17, 1996, at 12. One quarter of these breaches did not involve company insiders. Id.
24. See Levin, supra note 20 ("Moreover, in certain larger disputes, the negative public relations
resulting from an admission to the loss of valuable trade secrets, or of interference with proprietary
technologies, make litigation wholly undesirable.").
25. See id.; cf. 1 JAGER, supra note 2, § 1.03 at 1-8 n.23 (stating that in 1978 trade secret thefts
in the U.S. were estimated to cost $4 billion annually).
26. See John Brandt, Theft in (Your) Office, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 17, 1996, at 6; see also
DeYoung, supra note 23.
27. Foreign intelligence agents, like those of France's Direction Generale de la Securite, actively
target American companies. See Roderick P. Deighen, Welcome to Cold Waril, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Jan.
1993, at 42; Farnham & Lee, supra note 22 ("The FBI reports that 23 foreign governments are
systematically vacuuming U.S. corporations of their intellectual assets."); Ronald J. Ostrow & Paul
Richter, Economic Espionage Poses Major Peril to U.S. Interests, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at Al.
In July, 1991, a French consular officer was spotted dumpster diving outside the house of a high-tech
industry executive in Houston, Texas. See Jeff Augustini, From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal
and Policy Issues Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage, 26 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 459 (Jan. 1995).
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being.' Unfortunately, U.S. businesses have been slow to defend properly
themselves against the threat of foreign industrial espionage. 29 By one
estimate, fewer than 5% of U.S. companies have a business counterintelligence
system in place, as compared with close to 100% of all Japanese companies.3"
Trade secrets are a primary target of industrial spies, a fact reflected in
both the growing number of trade secret misappropriation cases,31 and
Congress' enactment of the EEA.32 But in their efforts to address the threat
of industrial espionage, courts and legislatures have generally overlooked one
pervasive method of industrial espionage: dumpster diving.
Dumpster diving is one of the easiest and safest ways of gathering
confidential information, 33 and yields secrets ranging from corporate exec-
utives' travel itineraries to descriptions of company merger plans.34 The
predatory nature of dumpster diving is demonstrated by the case of an interna-
tional shipping company that got started by dumpster diving for the telex spools
of an established company, then used customer lists on the spools to lure away
clients. As the value of intangible information rises exponentially, so too
does the sophistication of modem day trash pickers. Some companies even
specialize in combing trash for valuable items and information,3  and may
privately contract with trash collectors to obtain "recycled" computer paper and
whatever is printed on it. 7 While dumpster diving may not always yield trade
secrets directly, sophisticated corporate spies employ trash searches as part of
larger collection campaigns. Indeed, one security expert believes that dumpster
28. See DeYoung, supra note 23; cf. Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180
(7th Cir. 1991) ("Thefuture of the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry and the
efficiency of industry depends on no small part on the protection of intellectual property.") (emphasis
added).
29. While businesses should be encouraged to take more precautions, denying trade secret owners
legal remedies against dumpster diving is not the best way to do so. See supra text accompanying note
10.
30. See Yates, supra note 21.
31. A Circuit Court Judge for Baltimore County, Maryland remarked that "[i]n the past three to
five years these [trade secret misappropriation] cases have been coming out of our ears." Telephone
Interview with John F. Fader, II, Circuit Court Judge for Baltimore County (Jan. 2, 1997); see also
Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 180 ("This is an important case because trade secret protection is
an important part of intellectual property, a form of property that is of growing importance to the
competitiveness of American industry."); Levin, supra note 20 ("The volume of trade secret
misappropriation disputes has taxed many courts.").
32. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839, enacting P.L. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996); supra note 20, 131 and
infra Section VI.B.
33. See Atkinson, supra note 10 ("[Dumpster diving] is believed to be the number one method of
business and personal espionage.").
34. See DeYoung, supra note 23.
35. See Zachary Coile, Better Shred Than Read, S.F. EXAM., Aug. 29, 1994, at Dl.
36. See Novell, Inc. v. Weird Stuff, Inc., No. C92-20467JW/EAI, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6674,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 1993) (noting that the defendant's business of salvaging and reselling
discarded software literally involved diving into dumpsters); Coile, supra note 35.
37. DeYoung, supra note 23.
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diving is the most common form of industrial espionage. 31
B. Available Private Security Measures
"Ever since 1988 when the Supreme Court ruled that trash is public domain,
simply tearing up and throwing away important documentation is not
enough. "39
Available market solutions to the dumpster diving threat include heightened
physical security (e.g., fences, locks, and security guards) and thorough trade
secret disposal (through the use of paper shredders or incinerators). While
physical security measures such as fences and locks thwart dumpster diving by
limiting access to trash, these methods may not be possible if the trade secret
owner's trash bin is not located on her own property. Even if the trash bin is
located on a trade secret owner's property, the trash within the bin will still be
removed to a larger waste facility at some point, usually via a trash truck.
During this transport phase, and until the trash becomes irreversibly commin-
gled with other trash, the trade secret owner's physical security measures offer
no protection. Accordingly, in the absence of laws prohibiting dumpster diving,
a trade secret owner's protection during the post-dumpster phase of trade secret
disposal depends on the extent to which her trade secrets have been rendered
indiscernible.
To render trade secrets indiscernible, trade secret owners must turn to
methods of trade secret disposal. Trade secrets requiring destruction are
commonly found in the form of written documents, drawings or equations that
may be stored on paper or in electronic form. Trade secrets that are stored
electronically are more easily destroyed than those that are stored on paper (or
microform). The former may be erased literally at the push of a button, but the
latter require more deliberative and careful destruction.
Some trade secret owners may turn to recycling services for document
destruction, but these services are a poor substitute given the prevalence of
low-salaried workers and unsecured conditions in these services.' Further-
more, trash is often not shredded finely enough at recycling centers, and can
be put together adequately enough to find numbers and other potentially
harmful information. Worse still is the risk that the recycler may deliver the
38. See Atkinson, supra note 10 ("[Dumpster diving] is believed to be the number one method of
business and personal espionage.").
39. Cut-Shred-Co Paper Shredder Consultants, #1 in Paper Shredders (Internet advertisement) Oast
modified Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.cutshred.eom>.
40. See Jeff Louderback, Paper Chase. Every Business is Susceptible to Theft and Espionage and
the Danger Lurks in the Places You'd Least Expect, SMALL Bus. NEws-DAYTON, Aug. 1996, at 6.
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trade secret owner's trash directly to a competitor.41
Trade secret owners who choose to destroy their trade secrets that are fixed
on paper increasingly use paper shredders to do so. Paper shredding solutions
range from using small shredders as inexpensive as twenty dollars42 to hiring
sophisticated document destruction firms43 to handle every aspect of document
destruction. An on-site shredding policy might require employees to shred trade
secret materials in their offices or deposit them in special containers from
which documents will be collected and shredded elsewhere on the premises. To
avoid the cost and administrative burden of training permanent employees to
destroy trade secrets on-site, a trade secret owner may choose instead to hire
a document destruction company to destroy documents on or off-site with
truck-mounted mobile shredders.' Cautious trade secret owner may further
decide to send an employee to verify that the outside contractor is actually
destroying the secret documents entrusted to her. Similar precautions may be
necessary with firms that destroy corporate trash completely off-site. Given
trade secret owners' understandable concerns, some large shredder companies
destroy their clients' trade secrets behind a screen of obsessive security that can
include barbed wire fences and armed guards. One shredder company in
California conducts strip searches of its employees before and after every shift
and will fire employees on the spot for reading any documents before
destroying them.45 Despite such precautions, the private market may fall short
of providing adequate comfort to trade secret owners if document destruction
firms refuse to insure their customers up to the value of the trade secrets to be
destroyed. If the shredding company's negligence results in trade secret
revelation or theft, it is uncertain whether, in the absence of an express
contract, the trade secret owner would recover the full value of her intellectual
41. Such a conveyance occurred in the Drill Parts case. See Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 439 So.2d 43, 46 (Ala. 1983) (stating that the defendant had arranged to receive scrap metal and
discarded papers from the plaintiff's machine shop without the latter's knowledge). In Drill Parts,
however, the court implied that the scrap dealer who delivered the plaintiff's trash to the defendant did
not know the trash contained valuable trade secrets. Id.
42. See NBC Nightly News: Increase in Identity Thefts through Information Taken from Junk Mail
and Other Personal Documents Has Caused a Rise in Paper Shredder Sales (NBC television broadcast,
Nov. 19, 1997) ("Now you can buy one for $20 and it fits in the palm of your hand .... Next year,
a record million and a half people are expected to buy one.. . ."). Unfortunately, $20 shredders are
likely to shred paper into single strips that can, with patience, be reassembled enough to discern
important information. Cf United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp 629 (D. Mass 1992) (holding that federal
agents did not a need warrant to seize shredded trash discarded by a tax-evasion suspect since the latter
had no reasonable expectation of privacy by society's standards in such trash); Curbside
Trash-Reconstruction of Shredded Documents, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 11, 1991, at 13.
43. See Tim Urbonya, Rohn Industries Makes Sure That the Paper Trail Stops Here, MINNEAPOLIS-
ST. PAUL CITY Bus. DATELINE, Oct. 23, 1989, at 1. Private shredding companies are so numerous that
they even have their own trade organization-the National Association for Information Destruction. See
Coile, supra note 35.
44. See Wayne Tompkins, Shredders Working Overtime to Protect Privacy, Especially Financial,
FLA. TODAY, Sept. 13, 1996, at S12.




At first glance, choosing private protection over legal reform might appear
to be the best solution to dumpster diving since trade secret owners are more
motivated than society to protect their intellectual property and have better
information about the exact level of protection their respective secrets require.
However, adopting this view may force trade secret owners to spend excessive
amounts on private security and then recoup to costs by charging consumers
more for their products. Furthermore, forcing trade secret owners to rely
exclusively on private security measures implicitly endorses the very law of the
jungle among business competitors that has been condemned by trade secret
law.' Dictating that trade secret protection turn solely on an owner's efforts
to protect herself is the moral equivalent of dismissing burglary charges on the
grounds that the victim's door was unlocked or secured by a cheap lock. An
even closer analogy can be drawn between dumpster diving and trash searches
for credit card information. Denying legal recourse against dumpster divers is
the moral equivalent of allowing thieves who root through garbage piles for
receipts and records with personal datae7 to freely use the credit card numbers
they obtain. These trash searching thieves have become such a menace that
they were the focus of a recent story on the NBC Nightly News.48 Ordinary
citizens are so afraid of having their personal information stolen by such
dumpster diving "identity thieves" that they are buying personal paper
shredders in record numbers.49 The problem of credit card dumpster diving
is so wide-spread that many small businesses are taking extra precautions to
avoid negligently disclosing sensitive information about their customers or
employees. 50
Incredibly, our society chooses to punish credit card dumpster divers,51
but allows trade secret dumpster divers to steal freely those asserted trade
secrets that their corporate victims did not completely destroy before disposal.
This seemingly unjust result stems from the application of the ethics-neutral
Greenwood presumption to the trade secret law's reasonable precautions
46. See E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970)
("[lndustrial espionage of the sort here perpetrated has become a popular sport .... However, our
devotion to free-wheeling competition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the
standard of morality.... ."); see also Corporate Privacy, supra note 8, at 420 & n.161.
47. See Fisher, supra note 10; Credit Card Scam, supra note 10.
48. See NBC Nightly News, supra note 42 ("[Identity thieves] steal more than half a billion dollars
a year, often starting with something called dumpster diving .... ) (emphasis added).
49. See id.
50. See Louderback, supra note 40 (based on interviews with James Lang, owner of Professional
Security Associates in Beavercreek, Ohio and Curtis Slaton, a corporate-law attorney at Bogan,
Patterson and Bowman in Dayton, Ohio). Such unintended disclosure may expose such businesses to
criminal and civil liability, as well as the costly loss of business.
51. See Fisher, supra note 10.
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requirement.52
II. THE PRIVACY ANALOGY: WNNE AND TENNANTRAIONALES
Despite dumpster diving's prominent role in the growing industrial
espionage threat and the considerable cost (private and public) of private
security measures, dumpster diving has not been designated an improper means
of acquiring trade secrets. 53 Accordingly, a court's focus shifts away from the
defendant's possible improper conduct and towards examining the victim's
action to protect her trade secrets. One crucial determination that dictates
whether the plaintiff has a cause of action is whether or not the information
allegedly stolen was a trade secret at all. The Achilles' heel of a dumpster
diving victim's claims is that to be a trade secret, information must have been
secret even though it was in the trash. 4 Though absolute secrecy is not
required, the Greenwood presumption that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in trash undermines victims' claims of secrecy.
In ascertaining whether an owner took reasonable steps to protect her trade
secret, the fundamental question should be whether the precautions forced the
competitor to use improper, unethical or illegal means.55 But unless dumpster
diving is statutorily designated an improper means, courts will probably fail to
balance more fairly the reasonable precautions requirement and the improper
means provisions asserting that trade secrets may not be legally obtained by
means that are extreme, illegal, or unethical. Unfortunately, since most courts
considering dumpster diving cases are not guided by the presumption that
dumpster diving is against public policy, they will focus almost exclusively on
the nature of the victim's defenses against dumpster divers. Specifically, courts
will seek to determine whether the trade secret owner took reasonable secrecy
precautions. 56
When a court emphasizes the secrecy precautions requirement in a trade
secret case, it is forced to "make a factual determination as to whether the
owner used reasonable precautions" because it is impossible to articulate a
52. Cf. Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REv. 1076, 1119
(1988) (stating that the courts' failure to frame their examination of security in terms of equitable notice
makes evaluations of commercial morality difficult).
53. There is one exception: the Connecticut legislature classified dumpster diving as an improper
means by designating it a form of espionage. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51, as amended by Pub. Act
No. 97-110. See infra text accompanying note 126 for a discussion of the law.
54. According to the first Restatement of Torts, the plaintiff need only have maintained a substantial
level of security so that "except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring
the information." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (emphasis added).
55. See Slaby, supra note 16, at 331.
56. See id. at 325-26 ("Mhe law requires the trade secret owner to undertake actual efforts which




standard independent of a particular set of facts." As a result, courts have
tried to fill what one commentator has called "this standardless void""8 by
drawing an analogy to the Fourth Amendment conception of reasonable privacy
expectations.59 As demonstrated by the decisions in Tennant Co. v. Advance
Mach. Co.60 and Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer,61 the First Amend-
ment analogy has, respectively, both supported and undermined dumpster
diving claims.
A. The Tennant Rationale
The Fourth Amendment analogy has not always been applied to dumpster
divers' benefit. For example, in Tennant,' the Minnesota Court of Appeals
condemned a floor cleaning equipment manufacturer's use of dumpster diving
to discover a competitor's confidential sales information.63 In this case, the
court applied California law since the dumpster diving occurred in that state.
The plaintiff Tennant Co. ("Tennant") sued its competitor the Advance
Machine Co. ("Advance") after some of Advance's employees "rummaged
through the trash in a dumpster behind Tennant's western regional sales office
57. Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 3, at 464.
58. See id. at 464.
59. See id. ("[C]ommentators implicitly suggest that if the owner of a trade secret has secured a
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy, he has used reasonable precautions in protecting
his trade secret. Consequently, any violation of a trade secret owner's reasonable expectation of privacy
must constitute misappropriation.").
60. 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
61. No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991)
62. 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Tennant was based on Fourth Amendment analogy
as applied under the then ruling case of People v. KIivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971) (invalidating a
warrantless police search on the grounds that the defendant held a reasonable expectation that searched
trash would be taken by authorized collectors and mixed with trash from other sources) vacated, 409
U.S. 33, reaffirmed, 504 P.2d 457 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919; see also United States v. Kahan,
350 F. Supp. 784, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (invalidating a warrantless police search on grounds that "the
undisputable expectation of an employee who discards items in his own wastebasket is that they
subsequently will be disposed of and destroyed without prior inspection by others."). After the ruling
in Greenwood, Tennant and Kahan were of no avail to trade secret owners.
63.Tennant was not the only case to condemn dumpster diving as a trade secret theft. An Alabama
court found that it was not a "plain and palpable abuse of discretion to find a misappropriation of a trade
secret although evidence was presented that plaintiff's drawings had been found in a trash bin." Drill
Parts and Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d 43 (Ala. App. Ct. 1983). More recently, two dumpster
diving cases in California were resolved through settlement. See Silvaco Data Sys., Inc. v. Technology
Modeling Assoc., 896 F. Supp. 973, 974 ("The events leading to the current litigation began in the
summer of 1991 when TMA started to suspect that someone was illicitly stealing trade secrets by
'dumpster diving' in the trash bins behind their offices .... After substantial discovery was completed,
the parties agreed to a settlement on July 27, 1992.");- "Dumpster Diving" Presents Questions of Fact,
3 Mealey's Litigation Reports, Jan. 13, 1995 (discussing a Santa Clara County Superior Court judge's
refusal to dismiss a trade secret claim on the grounds that dumpster diving presents a question of fact
to be resolved by the jury); Nancy Rivera Brooks, Ethics at Work: Gathering Competitive Intelligence
on Your Rivals Is Fine, Experts Agree, As Long As You Follow the Law. Just Watch Out for those Gray
Areas, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at D2 (discussing dumpster diving lawsuit by Balboa Capital in Los
Angeles that was settled but "raise[d] a host of ethical questions").
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in California" 64 for nearly six months. These dumpster dives against Tennant
were organized by Advance's West Coast sales manager, George McIntosh.
McIntosh, who enlisted the help of Advance's San Francisco sales manager,
sent "memos summarizing information from stolen documents" back to Jerry
Rau, Advance's vice president for industrial sales.' Mr. Rau testified that
when he learned about McIntosh's memos he took them lightly, thinking it was
a joke because he had not imagined that dumpster diving could be useful in any
way. However, once Tennant sued Advance, the president of Advance, Mr.
Pond, fired McIntosh. During trial in the lower court, Mr. Pond was asked
"whether he thought raiding the dumpster and rifling through a competitor's
trash was unethical."' Mr. Pond "equivocated" 67 but the Tennant court did
not: Judge Parker's opinion raised the issue of ethics once more by pointing
out that "the president of Advance, who personally hired the individuals
responsible for illegal activity, was indifferent to the ethics of their behav-
ior. "68
Judge Parker could designate McIntosh's dumpster diving illegal because
of the rule set forth by People v. Krivda69 that "an owner retains reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of a dumpster 'until the trash [has] lost
its identity and meaning by becoming part of a large conglomeration of trash
elsewhere.'"70 Unfortunately for trade secret owners in the future, Judge
Parker went on to proclaim that "One has the same expectation of privacy in
property regardless of whether the invasion is carried out by a law officer or
by a competitor."'" This statement could easily be interpreted as manifesting
Judge Parker's commitment to coupling permanently industrial espionage cases
to the Fourth Amendment rationale. However, given the ethical language that
Judge Parker used in other parts of his opinion, he might have written his
decision differently if Greenwood had been decided previously.
Tennant arguably touched on two of the three underlying purposes of trade
secret law-promoting commercial morality and protecting privacy interests.
One might even argue that the hint of cost-benefit analysis is implied in Judge
Parker's conclusion that it was enough that Advance "disposed of its waste in
a manner that would assure secrecy except to someone particularly intent on
finding out inside information."72





69. 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971). Krivda was overruled by Greenwood v. California, 486 U.S. 35
(1988). See infra text accompanying note 76.
70. Tennant, 355 N.W.2d at 725 (citing Krivda, 486 P.2d at 1268 (1971)).
71. Id.




B. The Winne Rationale & The Greenwood Presumption
Unfortunately for dumpster diving victims, the implications of the Fourth
Amendment analogy for dumpster divers were changed profoundly when
People v. Krivda73 was overruled by the Supreme Court's 6-274 decision in
Greenwood v. California.' In Greenwood, Justice White proclaimed that
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in sealed trash bags put
out for collection, police may search such trash without a warrant.76 White
supported this holding by asserting that there is no privacy interest in trash that
is left on the curb for collection since it is "common knowledge" that trash
placed beyond the curtilage of an individual's home is "readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. "77
The damage caused by this presumption that trash is in the public domain (the
"Greenwood presumption") became apparent when it was incorporated into
trade secret law by a Pennsylvania federal district court in Frank W. Winne &
Son, Inc. v. Palmer.78 As in Tennant, dumpster diving was the central issue
in the Winne case. The defendant, Jared Palmer, was the president of the Twi-
Ro-Pa rope manufacturing and vending business that was in direct competition
with the plaintiff, Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. Palmer allegedly ordered one
of his Philadelphia salesmen to "collect the trash which [Winne] had 'put out
for collection' and to forward all office documents therein to Palmer." 79 This
Palmer's salesman did as ordered for over a year until Winne discovered that
its trash was being taken and sued Palmer for trade secret theft.'c
Early in its opinion, the Winne court stated that there was no litmus test for
what constitutes a trade secret; this issue was generally a fact for the jury."'
Nonetheless, the court summarily asserted that there was no trade secret
protection for confidential business information that was placed in the trash
since "[t]here are a number of Fourth Amendment cases holding that there is
73. 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971).
74. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
75. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
76. Greenwood paved the way for often unpopular warrantless police searches of trash. News
reporters' searches through trash cans constitute an equally unpopular activity, but one reporter's recent
search of police trash in Connecticut probably struck Greenwood's detractors as poetic justice. See Bill
Keveney & Lynn Tuohy, TV Journalists Halted at Dumpster: Prosecutor Reviewing Law for Possible
Violation at Courthouse, HARTFORD COuRANT, Sept. 13, 1996, at B9.
77. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
78. No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991). However, for
an example of one of the few ways through which the Greenwood presumption might actually further
intellectual property rights, see Guilty in Industrial Spying Case, UPI, Oct. 18, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file (discussing the FBI's use of dumpster diving to crack a Silicon
Valley industrial espionage case against David Biehl, President of the now defunct Semiconducter
Spares, Inc.).
79. Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183 at *2.
80. See id.
81. See id. at *4.
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash which is placed out for
collection."' However, the court did point out that it did "not appear from
the complaint whether the documents placed in the trash were intact or
shredded and then reconstructed, or whether they were retrieved from an area
generally accessible to others or exclusively under plaintiff's ownership and
control. " 8 The court then remarked: "[tlhus, the record must be more fully
developed regarding how the trash was stored, where it was placed and what
other precautionary measures may have been taken."8 The Winne court did
not hold that a trade secret could never exist in trash, but it did refuse to
decouple the privacy interests of trade secret owners from those of suspects
subjected to Fourth Amendment searches.'
Im. THE WINNE RATIONALE'S MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE GREENVIOD
PRESUMPTION
There are two problems with the Winne rationale's reliance on the
Greenwood presumption. First, unlike law enforcement officers who are public
officials sworn to uphold the law, dumpster divers are self-interested,
unregulated parties with no legitimate, publicly sanctioned justification for their
trash searches. Second, modern trash is no longer the uniformly worthless
material that it was considered to be before the advent of recent advances in
information technologies.
A. The Value of Trash: Towards A Modern View
The Winne court's reliance on the Greenwood presumption that there is no
expectation of privacy in trash is based on antiquated notions about the nature
and value of trash in the modern business world. The Greenwood majority
commented that "having deposited their garbage 'in an area particularly suited
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the
express purpose of having strangers take it,' respondents could have had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discard-
ed."' Contradicting this conclusion is the fact that in today's information
society there are two kinds of trash: (1) trash that is abandoned to the world,
and (2) trash that is meant to be kept secret until destroyed. Trade secrets that
may be gleaned from discarded office paper, diskettes, and the like fall into the
second category.
Old notions about trash overemphasize its tangible aspects. However,
82. Id. at *10 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)).
83. Id. at *12.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *11.
86. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41.
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dumpster divers target intangible wealth. Such intangible wealth increasingly
drives our economy as more goods and services are transferred via electrons
and microwaves. As Nicholas Negroponte proclaims, intangible electronic bits
of information are becoming increasingly more important than atoms.'
Earlier in U.S. history, society's reluctance to revise its views about garbage
led to health epidemics. 8 Once again, short-sightedness about the evolving
nature of trash threatens the public well-being, this time by supporting a legal
policy that condones industrial espionage. We should modify our legal views
of trash to better fit this changing aspect of our economy.
If the law does not protect trade secrets at all points in the public disposal
process, businesses will be forced to adopt a separate, private, system of waste
disposal. Such a private system may already exist, given the exponential
growth in paper shredders and document destruction services. However, the
shift towards such private systems does not dictate that trade secret law should
deny protection from dumpster divers any more than the growth of the home
security industry dictates that the law should deny protection from burglars.
B. Official ersus Unofficial Trash Searches
While the Winne court admitted that Greenwood was not a trade secret
case, 9 it nonetheless relied on Greenwood to conclude that "it is rather
difficult to find that one has taken reasonable precautions to safeguard a trade
secret when one leaves it in a place where, as a matter of law, he has no
reasonable expectation of privacy from prying eyes." 9' However, this
assertion does not address the fact that the police are subject to checks and
balances that do not apply to dumpster divers. For example, though the police
may surreptitiously extract evidence from trash, at some point they will
announce the results of their trash search. In contrast, dumpster divers will
seek to keep their searches permanently secret. Additionally, official trash
searches are ostensibly conducted for the public good, while dumpster dives
intentionally avoid the beneficial alternative of reverse engineering or publicly
available information. Accordingly, the Winne rationale overlooks the fact that
police, and even trash collectors, are public servants entrusted with carrying
out official functions for the public good. Dumpster divers are self-interested
parties who choose, unethically, to siphoning off the intellectual efforts of
others. Dow Chemical Co. v. EPA9 suggests that Greenwood's characteriza-
87.See NICHOLAS P. NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGrrAL 4 (1995). Mr. Negroponte is a Professor of
Media Technology at MIT and the Founding Director of the MIT Media Lab.
88.See MARTIN V. MELS!, GARBtAGE IN THE CmEs: REFUSE, REFORM, AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
1880-1980, at 19-20 (1981).
89. Wimne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11.
90. Id.
91. 476 U.S. 227 (1984) (holding that the EPA may take aerial photographs of plaintiff's facilities
for purposes of enforcing environmental laws).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 16:195, 1997
tion of the public domain as extending to trash should be limited to Fourth
Amendment searches by government officers and other public officials. 92
A case can be made that individuals should not receive greater privacy from
private actors than from government officials. 93 This argument might
emphasize that the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from arbitrary or
oppressive governmental intrusions that, because they have the force of the
state behind them, are particularly invasive and harmful. However, the ranks
of dumpster divers include powerful multi-national corporations and foreign
nations that can devote considerable resources towards surreptitious trash
searches. 94
Finally, Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.95 elevated the
"fundamental human right of privacy . . .. to the position of significant
additional public policy reason for the protection of trade secrets by state
law."' Accordingly, the development of a separate privacy jurisprudence
tailored to trade secret law is preferable to the rigid coupling to Fourth
Amendment law that the Winne rationale represents,' undergirded by the
Greenwood presumption that threatens to undermine the principle that efforts
to protect trade secrets need not be spy-proof.98
92. See id at 239 n.6 (1984) ("[O]ther protections such as trade secret laws are available to protect
commercial activities from private surveillance by competitors."); see also Lariscey v. United States,
949 F.2d 1137, 1141-43 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that an imprisoned inventor took reasonable
precautions to maintain secrecy under the circumstances of his incarceration, and therefore had a
protectable trade secret).
93. A possible argument was set up by one commentator as a straw man: "All invasions of a
reasonable expectation of privacy thus would be considered improper means of securing a trade secret,
but not all constitutionally permissible activity would be considered proper means." Note, Trade Secret
Misappropriation:A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth AmendmentAnalogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461,
472 (1992). In dismissing this argument, the commentator states that courts would be left "without
guidance in determining when, and to what extent, trade secret law should provide greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment." Id. This point does not consider the fact that prevailing standards of the
business community may be considered in determining each case under an ethical framework depending,
of course, on the factual context of each case. The commentator above, however, precludes such an
ethical framework by dismissing the ethical component of the Christopher case as "moralistic rhetoric."
While it is true that the Fifth Circuit in Christopher used a kind of cost-benefit rationale, this test was
not the only basis of the court's decision. Such arguments fail to adequately account for trade secret
law's migration to the law of unfair competition. In this new field, courts and commentators should
reconsider any past attempts to pin trade secret law under any crisp rules or bright line tests. See Robert
C. Denicola & Harvey S. Perlman, A Foreword to the Symposium on the Restatement of Unfair
Competition, 47 S.C. L. REV. (1996). ("Much of the Restatement's so-called 'black-letter' law takes
the form of broad standards and catalogs of relevant factors rather than crisp rules and bright line tests.
Although not new to the Restatements, we think this approach is particularly appropriate in a field such
as unfair competition where context is so often everything.").
94. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
95. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
96. 1 JAGER, supra note 2, § 1.05, at 1-15.
97. See Corporate Privacy, supra note 8, at 400-01 ("Since [United States v.] Morton Salt [, 338
U.S. 632 (1950)], limited to its facts, held only that a corporation has no right of privacy vis-a-vis
governmental regulatory inquiries, it is not necessarily authority for the denial of a corporate right of
privacy in other contexts.") (citations omitted).
98. See E.I. DuPont deNemours v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
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IV. CHPJS7'OPHER AND THE COST OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY
"T]hou shalt not appropriate a trade secret through deviousness under
circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not reasonably avail-
able. ,-9
"Perfect security is not optimal security.
To warrant legal protection, a trade secret must be secret, but not
absolutely so.10 1 Indeed the common law has promoted relative rather than
absolute secrecy since the discussion of secrecy in Peabody v. Norfolk.Iea
Under the Fourth Amendment analogy, relative secrecy hinged on reasonable
expectations of privacy. However, one commentator has argued that the
reasonableness of security measures should be determined through cost-benefit
analysis. 3 Like the Fourth Amendment analogy, a cost-benefit approach
would not require that secrecy precautions be absolute.
For example, in the famous "spy-in-the-sky" case, E.L DuPont deNemours
v. Christopher,"4 the Fifth Circuit held that secrecy precautions need not be
spy-proof. The plaintiff, the DuPont chemical company, was constructing a
new chemical plant that would use valuable new trade secrets to produce
methanol. DuPont took extensive precautions to restrict access to and view of
its plant. However, parts of the uncompleted facility were not covered by a
roof. The defendants, the Christophers, took advantage of this fact, and, under
the employ of DuPont's competitor, flew over the unfinished chemical plant in
an airplane. Appropriately disturbed by the plane's presence, DuPont
investigated immediately and discovered that the Christophers had taken photo-
graphs of the plant for a competitor. When the Christophers refused to reveal
the name of their client or to yield the pictures, DuPont sued the Christophers
for trade secret theft.
DuPont charged that the Christophers had wrongfully obtained the
99. Id. at 1017 (holding that aerial spying on a competitor's trade secret through otherwise legal
means nonetheless constituted improper means).
100. Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991).
101. Secrecy is the threshold issue in every trade secret case. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757
cmt. b (1939) ("The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret."); 1 JAGER, supra note 2, § 5.05,
at 5-58.1 ("The single most important requirement of the trade secret law is the obvious one which
deserves continuous emphasis-that the trade secret must in fact be secret."). However, any cases
requiring absolute secrecy are in a "distinct minority." MiLGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 3, at 2-75
through 76.
102. 98 Mass. 452, 461 (1868).
103. See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 3, at 472-73. ("Instead of the Fourth
Amendment analogy, which primarily promotes privacy interests, courts should use a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether an owner has taken reasonable precautions.").
104. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
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photographs and sold them to a third party. The photos, DuPont argued, could
be used by an expert engineer to discern DuPont's secret methanol manufactur-
ig process. In response to DuPont's claim of trade secret theft, the Christo-
phers argued that neither flying over DuPont's plant nor taking pictures from
an airplane was illegal. Although the Chrisptophers' activity, like dumpster
diving that does not involve trespass, was legal on its face, it was condemned
as an improper means of obtaining DuPont's trade secret. In holding that
DuPont had taken reasonable precautions despite the Christophers' successful
surveillance, the Fifth Circuit proclaimed: "Perhaps ordinary fences and roofs
must be built to shut out incursive eyes, but we need not require the discoverer
of a trade secret to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the
unpreventable methods of espionage now available." 105 The court went on to
explain that requiring DuPont "to put a roof over the unfinished plant would
impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a schoolboy's trick
.... Reasonable precautions against predatory eyes we may require, but an
impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement. " 106
The language in Christopher about "unanticipated" espionage suggests that
if the case were decided today on the same facts, the court might deny relief
on the grounds that it is common knowledge that industrial spies use aerial
photography. If the court rejected the idea that the espionage could not be
detected, the rationale of Christopher might collapse into an argument about the
cost of detectability and prevention. While the promotion of innovation requires
that the law prevent the redirection of valuable resources away from productive
invention and towards inefficient self-protection, the promotion of innovation
is only one of the policies underlying trade secret law.lc 7 The promotion of
commercial morality and the protection of privacy are the others."' Accord-
ingly, the public policy of promoting commercial morality mandates that courts
address the ethicality of allowing "predatory eyes" and the cost of private
prevention alone to dictate which particular schoolboy's tricks the courts will
protect trade secrets from.' °9
Though Christopher suggests that courts must consider the cost1 ° of
preventing unpredictable or undetectable espionage, a cost-benefit analysis
should not be the sole measure for determining the existence of a trade secret.
105. Id. at 1017.
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 4.
108. See supra text accompanying note 2.
109. See infra text accompanying note 109.
110. See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 3, at 465; see, e.g., Rockwell Graphic
Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Obviously [the plaintiff] could have taken
more precautions. But at a cost, and the question is whether the additional benefit in security would have
exceeded that cost."); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 902 & n.12 (Mass.
1979) (suggesting optimization rather than the maximization of security measures and concluding on that




Although one commentator has argued that a cost-benefit approach would yield
more predictable decisions than those made under the Fourth Amendment
analogy, a cost-benefit approach alone does not adequately address the oldest
purpose of trade secret law-upholding a minimum level of commercial
ethics."' If a trade secret owner fails the cost-benefit analysis, she will lose
her right to legal protection no matter how egregiously unethical the methods
used by her competitors to obtain them. For this reason, courts should consider
an approach that supplements privacy and cost-benefit analysis with careful
consideration of commercial ethics.
V. TRADE SECRET LAw's ETHICAL BLINDSPOr (ESPIONAGE IS
UNETHICAL)
When asked whether he thought raiding the dumpster and rifling through a
competitor's trash was unethical, Pond equivocated by saying that he did not
have enough information to make a judgment on those practices.112
I have three tests: the newspaper test, the child test and the skunk test.113
Dumpster diving is sleazy.14 Both the Fourth Amendment analogy and
cost-benefit framework overlook the ugly truth that dumpster diving 15
offends the generally accepted standards of commercial morality. Despite
predictable cynicism,"" members of the business world-with the exception
of animals, children, scavengers11-are expected to follow 18 minimum
111. Early American cases on trade secretmisappropriation emphasized enforing business morality
among competitors over the encouragement of innovation. See, e.g., Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20
N.Y.S. 110, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892) (holding that the efforts of two employees to start a photographic
film business with their former employer's trade secrets was "not legitimate competition, which it is
always the policy of the law to foster and encourage, but it is contra bonos mores.... "); see also Note,
Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 3, at 464.
112. Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
113. Nancy Rivera Brooks, Ethics at Work: Gathering Competitive Intelligence on Your Rivals Is
Fine, Experts Agree, As Long As You Follow the Law. Just Watch Out for those Gray Areas, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, Part D2, at 9 (quoting W. Michael Hoffman, executive director of the Center for
Business Ethics, Bentley College). Mr. Hoffman's statement was offered as advice to well-meaning
companies seeking to navigate ethical gray areas:
"The newspaper test is: Would you want to see it printed the next morning in the newspaper?
Would it embarrass you? The child test: What would you tell your child to do if he or she
came to you and asked for your advice? And the skunk test: Does it smell?" Hoffman said.
"If it doesn't feel right, smell right, taste right, then you probably should find out what makes
it seem like a skunk."
Id.
114. One business ethics consultant warns businesses that typical violations of fair trade laws
include "obtaining a competitor's trade secrets in a sleazy manner." DANIEL A KILE, BUSINESS
CONDUCT AND ETHICS: How TO SET UP A SELF-GOVERNANCE PROGRAM at 8-15 (1995).
115. And indeed industrial espionage in general. See Brooks, supra note 111.
116. One commentator argues that the notion of "'[generally accepted standards of commercial
morality' provides little if any guidance." Statutory Solution, supra note 22, at 388 n.58.
117. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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ethical standards.119 Dumpster diving falls below these ethical norms, but
courts have not condemned dumpster diving."n Instead, as demonstrated by
Winne and Christopher, courts have avoided assessing whether dumpster diving
is ethical by focusing exclusively on either the victim's expectation of privacy
or the effectiveness of their secrecy precautions."'
Perhaps the courts' failure to consider the unethical nature of industrial
espionage can be explained by the law's long-standing focus on cases involving
breaches of trust. Though many industrial spies are not in a position of
confidence," courts must rely on precedent that focuses on breaches of trust
by insiders who were in such positions. Nonetheless, early trade secret cases
used flexible equity rationales and emphasized the enforcement of commercial
morality."2 In 1939, the Restatement (First) of Torts addressed espionage in
Section 757, and set forth that improper means are "means which fall below
the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable
conduct."124 Furthermore, the new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
suggests that the only proper way to obtain trade secrets, in the absence of
their owners' consent, is by independent discovery or through the "examination
118. See, e.g., GEORGE D. CHRYssIDEs & JOHN H. KALER, AN INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS
ETcs, (1993); THOMAS M. GARRETT, BUSINESS ETHICS 99 (1966) ("Technological advance has
created new gray areas. While the present writer is almost instinctively against the use of devices which
violate privacy with or without trespass, there are many cases which can only be settled by careful
legislation. In the absence of such law, companies will have to take increasing care of their secrets.");
WALTER W. MANLEY I, CRITICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS CONDUCT: LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL
CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990S (1990).
119. In a general sense, ethics represent a "systematic attempt, through the use of reason to make
sense of our individual and social moral experience, in such a way as to determine the rules that ought
to govern human conduct and the values worth pursuing in life." Business ethics focus specifically on
the relationship of business goals and techniques to specifically human ends. See Wiesner & Cava, supra
note 52, at 1082 (quoting GARRETr, supra note 114, at 4 (1966)).
120. See Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., 355 N.W.2d 720 (1984), came the closest to
addressing the unethical nature of dumpster diving. See id. at 723 ("When asked whether he thought
raiding the dumpster and rifling through a competitor's trash was unethical, Pond equivocated by saying
that he did not have enough information to make a judgement on those practices."). Two scholars have
criticized the courts' failure to adequately analyze trade secrets within an ethical framework. C. Wiesner
& Cava, supra note 52, at 1081 ("The courts are not overly analytical in their pursuit of the ethical
issue, but they espouse ethical intentions.").
121. The unsuccessful Unfair Commercial Activities Act would have enjoined persons who engaged
in "acts or practices which violate reasonable standards of ethics." See Comment, Industrial Espionage:
Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 UCLA L. REV. 911, 926 n.79 (1967)
[hereinafter IndustrialEspionage] (citing H.R. 10038,87th Cong. (1962) reprinted in 23 OHIO ST. L.J.
110, Annex (1962)). If successful, the Act might have been used to justify the courts' focus on the act
of surveillance rather than upon the act of piracy. See Industrial Espionage, supra, at 926 n.79.
122. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970); cf
Corporate Privacy, supra note 8, at 406 ("mhe typical industrial espionage situation involves no
confidential relationship.").
123. See Pace, supra note 3, at 435 n.23 (citing Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 116
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892); KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 240-41 (1988).
124. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
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of a publicly available product.""'5
The examination of such publicly available products is a means of achieving
the ethically acceptable goal of gathering competitive intelligence. Competitive
intelligence has become so common place that it is considered an industry
complete with its own professional association-the Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals ("SCIP"). 2 However, there is a gray area between
competitive intelligence and industrial espionage. Dumpster diving, like the
aerial surveillance in Christopher, falls into this gray area.
Because dumpster diving is an unethical and destructive practice, trade
secret owners should not be abandoned to protect themselves exclusively
through security measures such as guards, electronic surveillance and paper
shredders. 27 To abandon trade secret owners to such private protection is the
moral equivalent of abandoning homeowners to private protection against
burglary. Society should make the moral statement that dumpster diving is
wrong and will not be tolerated, even though it, like burglary, can be
prevented through private security measures. Judges and state legislators should
not be swayed by arguments that bolstering laws against dumpster diving will
encourage underinvestment in proper security measures. As with homeowners,
trade secret owners will use private security measures regardless of laws
against dumpster diving-laws against burglary do not affect appreciably the
sales of locks and keys. More difficult questions than whether or not to enact
laws against dumpster diving is whether those laws should be criminal or civil,
and whether they should be newly drafted, or simply a modification of existing
law.
VI. THE CONNECTICUT SOLUTION AND THE EEA
A. The Connecticut Solution: Dumpster Diving As Espionage
On June 6, 1997, the State of Connecticut designated dumpster diving as
a form of espionage and therefore an improper means of obtaining trade
secrets."as This revision of Connecticut's trade secret law (the "Connecticut
solution") tipped the balance of advantage in litigation in favor of trade secret
owners by making it less likely that courts applying Connecticut law will
simply dismiss dumpster diving claims for failing to state a claim. The
Connecticut solution does not greatly disrupt the legal status quo since it was
woven into existing trade secret law. Connecticut's new law does not relieve
125. RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETTON § 39 cmt. f (1995).
126. See Brooks, supra note 111. SCIP has nearly 6,000 members and a code of ethics. Id.
127. Such an abandonment would clearly offend the oldest purpose of trade secret law-upholding
a minimum level of business ethics. See supra note 4.
128. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51, as amended by Pub. Act No. 97-110; supra note 19.
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trade secret owners of the responsibility to take precautions since Connecticut
courts will still continue to weigh, in dumpster diving cases, the extent of other
measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information. Furthermore,
Connecticut's new law affords trade secret owners more protection without
curtailing the activities of harmless trash pickers like the homeless.
By classifying dumpster diving as espionage, Connecticut clarified, in light
of the sixth factor in the Restatement's famous six-factor test for trade secret
misappropriation-the ease with which information could be properly
acquired-that dumpster diving is never proper acquisition. The new law
underscores that the issue of whether a defendant's conduct is improper should
be determined under the "existing standards of the business community."129
The 1939 Restatement of Torts defined improper means as those "means which
fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct." 130 An Alabama Court found that it was not a "plain and
palpable abuse of discretion to find a misappropriation of a trade secret
although evidence was presented that plaintiff's drawings had been found in a
trash bin."131
The Connecticut solution is necessary to guide courts away from the
Greenwood presumption, which courts were likely to adopt absent the
legislature's conclusion that dumpster diving should be discouraged as a matter
of public policy.132
As mentioned above, the Winne rationale leads courts to conclude that
discarding trash from which trade secrets may be discerned is equivalent to
intentionally abandoning the trade secrets themselves. The cost-benefit analysis
focus suggested in Christopher relies too much on trade secret owners' efforts
to protect themselves as opposed to how competitors seek to obtain them
improperly. The Connecticut solution to this dilemma lies between the two
extremes of: (1) forcing trade secret owners to rely solely on private prevention
through increased security or civil suits brought under the current law, and (2)
altering the law to mandate public prevention by criminalizing dumpster diving.
Classifying dumpster diving as industrial espionage, and therefore an improper
means, is a straightforward solution that indirectly addresses the immorality of
dumpster diving campaigns without requiring considerable tinkering with the
status quo. Nonetheless, although Connecticut offers trade secret owners
considerably more legal protection against dumpster divers, it does not clearly
mandate that courts incorporate an ethical analysis into trade secret opinions.
129. RSATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
130. Id. Examples of such means include "fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure,
tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage." Id.
131. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d 43 (App. Ct. Ala. 1983).




B. The Economic Espionage Act
Congress' enactment of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996133
(EEA)-the first national law designed to crack down on economic espionage
by foreign and domestic companies-sent a clear signal that trade secret theft
is a serious problem worthy of national attention. With the EEA, Congress
radically departed from the tradition of state-prescribed trade secret laws,'
and involved federal resources in the fight against trade secret theft. During the
years of debate, testimony and investigation that led to the EEA, FBI Director
Freeh and other experts pointed out that state trade secret laws, which have no
criminal liability attached to them, lacked the reach or power to deal with
foreign-sponsored economic espionage. Furthermore, experts said that civil
suits are difficult to win and seldom recoup the damage done, because the trade
secret thief s financial resources are often inadequate, especially if the thief has
been indemnified by his principal.'35 While the EEA is an important reform,
one commentator remarks that it is unclear whether "[flederal authorities will
be inclined to prosecute as criminal violations those matters that were
traditionally resolved as private commercial disputes." 136
Criminal statutes enacted on the state level arguably would do more to deter
dumpster diving than the EEA, which will probably be applied only in
sensational cases involving trade secrets worth large amounts of money.137
Criminal statutes like those forbidding eavesdropping, wiretapping, or even
stalking would greatly bolster the protection of trade secrets from dumpster
divers. For example, wiretaps have been forbidden for so long that courts
instinctively associate such activity with unethical behavior. Indeed, the
impropriety of wiretapping is so widely accepted that one seldom stops to
reflect on the ethical purposes underlying laws against intercepting communica-
tions. If laws specifically forbidding credit card dumpster diving were enacted,
such laws might soon loosen the intellectual bonds that couple trade secret
privacy interests to the Fourth Amendment analogy. Accordingly, state
133. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839, enacting P.L. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996); see also S. Rep. No.
104-359 (1996). Under provisions of the EEA, an individual convicted of economic espionage may be
fined up to $250,000 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Corporations that sponsor such activity may
be fined up to $10 million. See Levin, supra note 20, at 5; Yates, supra note 21.
134. But cf. Pace, supra note 3 (discussing the proposal of federal trade secret regimes).
135. See EconomicEspionage:HearingsBeforethe Senate Intelligence Comm. and Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong. 103 (Feb. 28, 1996) (statement of Raymond Damadian, M.D., President and
Chairman of Fonar Corp. and inventor of the MRI medical scanning machine); cf. Holly Emrick Svetz,
Japan's New Trade Secret Law: We Asked For It Now What Have We Got?, 26 GEo.WASH. J. INT'L
L. & EcoN. 413, 440 (1992) ("Criminal punishment of misappropriating individuals, without also
prosecuting or enjoining the users or buyers of the trade secrets, is an inadequate remedy for industrial
espionage.").
136. Levin, supra note 20.
137. Seeld. ("Ordinarily ... only extremely egregious trade secret misappropriation, such as those
alleged in General Motors v. Lopez, have warranted intervention of federal law.").
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criminal laws addressing dumpster diving for trade secrets could be an even
better deterrent than the Connecticut solution. Conceivably, those opposing
criminalization might argue that criminalization would commit scarce public
resources to protecting trade secret owners from foreseeable threats that they
could avoid with private security measures. This argument, however, is the
moral equivalent of arguing that public monies could be saved by cutting police
patrols in high-crime neighborhoods since private citizens can buy Rottweilers,
home security systems, pepper spray, handguns, and bullet proof vests on the
open market. In light of this last analogy, the appropriate question for dumpster
diving is: What kind of commercial community do we want to promote?
VII. CONCLUSION
Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights,
and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society. 13
8
The Fourth Amendment analogy and the cost-benefit framework lead judges
to focus narrowly on the extent of the precautions taken by trade secret owners
to keep their intellectual property out of dumpster divers' reach, and to ignore
the important ethical question of whether dumpster diving is ever a reasonable
means of obtaining trade secrets. Given trade secret law's clearly stated
purpose of maintaining minimum levels of business ethics, the latter question
should be asked using the "generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct."139 Trade secret law's failure to make a
clear unified statement about the ethicality of dumpster diving campaigns
encourages this unethical behavior, thereby undermining trade secret law's
ethical purpose. The Connecticut solution, which designates dumpster diving
as a form of espionage was an important reform and may serve as an example
for other states. Triggering the "espionage" provisions of current trade secret
laws is a good solution under the current regime, even if it does no more than
prevent judges from dismissing causes of action against dumpster divers for
failure to state a claim. Furthermore, the Connecticut solution requires private
prevention of dumpster diving without abdicating society's responsibility to
condemn and discourage unethical business practices. Likewise, the EEA may
afford trade secret owners protection against the most egregious dumpster
diving attacks, especially those conducted by foreign governments. Nonethe-
less, since much of trade secret remains a patchwork of widely varying state
law, true reform should include evolution of the common law of trade secrets
138. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right ofPrivacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 193
(1890).
139. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
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to address dumpster diving.
Admittedly, this solution may depend heavily on legal uniformity of the
sort that would result from adopting a Federal Trade Secrets Act. Even without
effecting such fundamental change, however, the national intellectual property
bar might influence lawmakers and judges nationwide to subscribe to this view,
though this would be an uphill battle. Currently, courts are likely to rely
almost exclusively on the Winne rationale and cost-benefit model to resolve
dumpster diving cases. Absent a clear statement from state legislatures or
Congress, courts may increasingly rely on these frameworks alone. In doing
so, the courts will promote a policy that undermines commercial ethics, ignores
privacy interests, and discourages innovation.

